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* This is an edited version of a paper delivered at a conference held in the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the occasion of its 10th anniversary.
The Environmental Jurisprudence of the
International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea*
Alan Boyle
Professor of Public International Law,
University of Edinburgh and Barrister,
Essex Court Chambers, London
ABSTRACT
This presentation starts out with an overview of the environmental jurisprudence of international tri-
bunals and courts in the last decade. The author then examines the jurisprudence of the ITLOS and con-
siders four issues that have arisen: the precautionary principle; environmental impact assessment;
environmental co-operation; and jurisdiction over marine environmental disputes. Concluding, he asks
what the jurisprudence tells us about the Tribunal’s role in the LOSC dispute settlement system. First,
the Tribunal’s provisional measures cases have established the utility of the Article 290 procedure as a
means of protecting the rights of other States but also the marine environment in general. Second, there
is evidence in the case law of a desire to settle disputes between the parties in a way that contributes
to the development of a consistent jurisprudence and of a willingness to interpret and apply Part XII of
the Convention in accordance with the contemporary state of international environmental law. The
Tribunal’s record on marine environmental disputes is a positive one.
A decade of environmental jurisprudence
The past decade has seen an unparalleled growth in the environmental
jurisprudence of international tribunals. No longer is it necessary to squeeze
every drop of life out of the immortal trio of arbitrations—Bering Sea Fur
Seals, Trail Smelter and Lac Lanoux—which have sustained international envi-
ronmental law throughout most of its existence. Since the Rio Conference in
1992, the subject as a whole has come of age. A modern account of interna-
tional environmental law would have nearly twenty cases decided since 1996
on which to draw. By any measure this is a substantial jurisprudence. Equally
remarkable is the number of courts and tribunals which have contributed to
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1 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’, UN
GAOR 56th Session Supplement No. 10 UN Doc A/56/10 (2001). See MOX Plant case (Ireland v.
United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) ITLOS No. 10 and
MOX Plant Arbitration (Jurisdiction) (2003) PCA (www.pca-cpa.org); Case concerning the
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures: Order of 13 July 2006) General List No. 135 [2006] ICJ Reports;
Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor
(Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003) ITLOS No. 12.
2 Annex VI to the 1991 Protocol on Antarctic Environmental Protection, adopted 2005. See
D J Bederman and S P Keskar, ‘Antarctic Environmental Liability: The Stockholm Annex
and Beyond’ (2005) 19 Emory Int. L.Rev. 1383–1406.
3 See ILC, ‘Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising
out of hazardous activities’ UN GAOR 61st Session Supplement No. 10 UN Doc A/61/10
(2006).
4 See Toronto Rules on Transnational Enforcement of Environmental Law in International
Law Association (ILA) Report of the 72nd Conference (Toronto 2006) (ILA, London 2006);
L A de La Fayette, ‘New Approaches to Addressing Damage to the Marine Environment’
(2005) 2 IJMCL 167; J Brunnée, ‘Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International
Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 351; R R
Churchill, ‘Civil Liability Litigation for Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties:
Progress, Problems and Prospects’ (2001) 12 YbIEL 3.
5 UN Compensation Commission, ‘Report and Recommendations Concerning 5th Instalment
of “F4” Claims’ (2006) paras. 4–58.
the jurisprudence, as well as the range and eclecticism of the issues that have
arisen. Its gestation may have been slow, but international environmental law
has proved a very vigorous plant.
Moreover, the growing case law affords little comfort for those who some-
times doubt the very existence of general international law dealing with the
environment, or who tend to see it all as soft law or comprised only of
specific treaty regimes. States have not sought to argue that general interna-
tional law does not require them to control transboundary pollution, or to carry
out environmental impact assessments (EIA), or to co-operate in the manage-
ment of environmental risks. They have not challenged the standard textbook
accounts of the subject or the International Law Commission’s (ILC) codifi-
cation of the law relating to transboundary harm.1 Rather, the focus of most of
the litigation has been on the adequacy or inadequacy of the measures States
have taken, or failed to take—on whether, for example, an appropriate EIA has
been carried out, or diligent pollution control laws exist, not on whether they
are necessary at all. Only in one area has judicial activity been noticeably
absent: liability for damage to the environment. On this topic many treaties
have been negotiated—including most recently an annex to the Antarctic
Environmental Protocol2—but the case law remains little further advanced
today than when the Trail Smelter case was decided over sixty years ago. The
ILC has made only limited progress in addressing this deficiency in its codification
work.3 There is nevertheless no shortage of material on which to draw in any
future litigation on this subject,4 including the final award of the United
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) on environmental damage claims
arising under UN Security Council Resolution 687.5 This award is the first
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6 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) (1999) ITLOS Nos. 3 & 4; MOX Plant (Provisional
Measures) (2001) ITLOS No. 10; Land Reclamation (Provisional Measures) (2003) (n 1).
7 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 1.
8 Icelandic Fisheries Cases [1974] ICJ Rep 3 and 175; Nuclear Tests Cases [1974] ICJ 
Rep 253 and 457.
9 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
10 Case concerning the Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ 
Rep 7.
11 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Provisional Measures) (2006) (n 1).
12 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (2000) 39 ILM 1359.
13 MOX Plant Arbitration (2003) (n 1).
14 Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention
(Ireland v. UK) (2003) PCA, 42 ILM 1118.
15 Case Concerning Land Reclamation By Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor
(Malaysia v. Singapore) (2005) PCA.
ever given by an international tribunal on compensation for environmental
monitoring, cleanup and reinstatement costs.
Of the decade’s environmental cases, only three have been decisions of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) dealing directly with
protection of the marine environment.6 At this stage of the Tribunal’s life that
is not an unhealthy record when compared to other courts and tribunals. It is
certainly no reason for undue modesty about the role of the Tribunal. In its
first ten years, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided only one case
with even tangential relevance to environmental matters—Corfu Channel7—
and quite what that case decides is uncertain even today. Not until 1974 did
the ICJ hear its first cases with a genuine environmental element—Icelandic
Fisheries and Nuclear Tests.8 Although both were pregnant with possibilities,
neither decision contributed much to the subsequent evolution of international
law on the environment. Thereafter, it was the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion9
which gave the ICJ its first real opportunity to say something of elementary
importance about environmental matters. Two more cases complete the ICJ’s
record of environmental jurisprudence in the last ten years—Gab ,cikovo-
Nagymaros10 and Pulp Mills Provisional Measures11—both cases about equi-
table utilisation of rivers, sustainable development and environmental impact
assessment. These are important decisions; nevertheless, within the lifespan of
the ITLOS, the ICJ has decided a mere three environmental cases in total,
only two on the merits.
Nor is the record of ad hoc arbitrations noticeably stronger. The Southern
Bluefin Tuna12 and MOX Plant13 arbitrations did not result in awards on the
merits, but both show how difficult it can be to engage LOSC compulsory
jurisdiction even in environmental disputes. OSPAR14 is confined to a very nar-
row point about access to commercially sensitive information, while Land
Reclamation15 simply endorses an agreement between the parties to settle 
the dispute. All four of these arbitrations are more interesting for what they
do not decide about international environmental law than for what they do
decide, although procedurally they have all been challenging to the coherence
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16 WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of
the Appellate Body (1998) WT/DS58/AB/R and Art 21.5 Report (2001) WT/DS58/AB/RW.
17 WTO, EC: Measures Affecting Asbestos, etc.—Report of the Appellate Body (2001)
WT/DS135/AB/R.
18 WTO, EC: Measures Concerning Meat And Meat Products (Beef Hormones)—Report of the
Appellate Body (1997) WT/DS26/AB/R.
19 Hatton v. UK (2003) 37 EHRR 611; Guerra v. Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357; Kyrtatos v.
Greece (2003) ECHR 242; Taskin v. Turkey (2004) ECHR; Öneryildiz v. Turkey [2004]
ECHR 657; Fadeyeva v. Russia (2005) ECHR 376. See L G Loucaides, ‘Environmental
Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 75
BYIL (2005) 249. There are other less notable cases which focus essentially on failure to
enforce the law and which I have discounted.
20 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action
Centre (SERAC) and The Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria (2001)
Communication No. 155/96.
21 See also Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (2001), Inter-Am C.H.R.
Ser. C, No. 20; Maya indigenous community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053,
Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004).
of international law and the availability of compulsory jurisdiction under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).
Compared to the ITLOS, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate
Body has been overwhelmed with litigation in its similarly short lifespan—not
necessarily a very good health indicator—but even it has decided no more
than three environmental cases within the decade. Apart from Shrimp-
Turtle16—its most important decision on an environmental question so far—the
only other environmental cases of real note at the time of writing are
Asbestos17 and Beef Hormones.18 Finally, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has made an outstanding contribution to environmental rights
jurisprudence, but there are still only six notable cases in the past decade.19
The Ogoniland case20 decided by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights is arguably the most important environmental decision of any interna-
tional tribunal in the same period. This is not the only environmental case
decided by a regional body in the developing world,21 but if the ITLOS can
claim to have decided nothing of comparable significance, neither can any
other court or tribunal.
So although there has been a very great increase in environmental litigation,
no court has either monopolised or dominated the field. Thanks to the prolif-
eration of international tribunals, the large number of cases has been widely—
perhaps thinly—spread. Seen from that angle, the ITLOS record is as good as
any other tribunal’s. Moreover, apart from ITLOS, only the WTO in Shrimp-
Turtle has decided anything relevant to the protection of the marine environ-
ment. Of the three ITLOS cases, all are provisional measures applications.
MOX Plant and Land Reclamation are both concerned with interpretation and
application of Part XII LOSC, including its provisions on prevention of pol-
lution, environmental impact assessment, co-operation and consultation, and in
the latter case also liability for possible damage. Southern Bluefin Tuna is of
course a fisheries dispute, concerned with Part VII of the Convention, rather
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22 IncludingGab ,cikovo, MOX Plant and Pulp Mills.
23 See Southern Bluefin Tuna (n 6) paras. 77–79. See also the WTO Appellate Body in Beef
Hormones (n 18).
than Part XII, but the Tribunal expressly regarded the conservation of the
living resources of the sea as an element in the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, and its references to the precautionary principle 
or approach are relevant in general terms to the interpretation and application
of Part XII.
Perhaps the first point to make about the Tribunal’s jurisprudence therefore
is that it has not taken a narrow view of what is meant by ‘the marine envi-
ronment’. In this respect it is surely correct: it is clear from the totality of
Articles 192–196 that Part XII was never intended to be simply about pollu-
tion, and that it encompasses protection of ecosystems, conservation of
depleted or endangered species of marine life, and control of alien species.
Moreover, Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference, the Convention on Biological
Diversity and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement all give a broad reading to the
responsibilities of States with regard to protection of the marine environment.
In this context conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources,
ecosystems and biological diversity are important elements, and the 1982
LOSC must be interpreted and applied accordingly.
Let me then turn to examine the jurisprudence. Four issues that have arisen
in the ITLOS cases will be considered here: the precautionary principle, envi-
ronmental impact assessment, environmental co-operation, and jurisdiction
over marine environmental disputes. The paper will conclude by asking what
the jurisprudence tells us about the Tribunal’s role in LOSC dispute settlement.
The precautionary principle or approach
The precautionary principle or precautionary approach has been pleaded in
several cases before various international tribunals,22 but the ITLOS ruling in
Southern Bluefin Tuna remains the only one that comes close to applying the
concept.23 Although the Judgment studiously avoids using the term ‘precau-
tionary,’ the Tribunal’s references to scientific uncertainty focus directly on the
core element of the precautionary approach as set out in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration. Calling on the parties to act ‘with prudence and caution’ can
be seen as an application of the precautionary approach, and as a ‘logical con-
sequence’ of the need to ensure effective conservation and avoid further seri-
ous harm to the fish stock in advance of the arbitration award. In this sense,
as Judge Treves observes, a precautionary approach recognising the uncertain-
ties involved is “inherent in the very notion of provisional measures.”
Despite the limited context of a provisional measures application, we can
probably read this Judgment as supporting a more general point identified by
Judges Laing and Treves: that the Convention should be interpreted and
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24 Judges Laing at paras. 16–19 and Treves at para. 9. See also M Nordquist (ed), UNCLOS
Commentary, vol. III, p. 288, and D Freestone, in A Boyle and D Freestone (eds),
International Law and Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999)
140.
25 See, e.g., the EU’s argument in the WTO Asbestos case and A Trouwborst, Evolution and
Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (The Hague 2001) 284.
Trouwborst sees the principle as the basis for comprehensive environmental protection both
nationally and internationally.
26 See WTO Appellate Body in Beef Hormones (n 18) at paras. 120–125.
27 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany v. Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, at para. 72.
28 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
Article 2 (2) (a). See also the 1995 Revised Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Article 4 (3) (a); 1996 Protocol for the Protection of
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources and Activities, Preamble.
29 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Article 1.
30 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping, Article IV(1)(a) and
Annex I as amended, 1993. See also the moratorium in force under the 1946 Whaling Convention.
applied taking account of the precautionary principle.24 It is not only the
fisheries conservation Articles of the 1982 LOSC which may have been
modified by the precautionary principle. The definition of pollution in Article 1,
the obligation to do an environmental impact assessment in Article 206, the
general obligation to take measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
under Article 194, and the responsibility of States for protection and preser-
vation of the marine environment under Article 235 are also potentially
affected by the more liberal approach to proof of environmental risk envisaged
by Rio Principle 15.
Some writers and governments have argued that the precautionary principle
or approach is a rule of customary international law.25 Like other international
tribunals considering the matter,26 as well as most governments, the ITLOS has
rightly been hesitant to accept this characterisation. The ICJ has so far said
nothing about the precautionary principle, although it was pleaded in
Gab ,cikovo and Pulp Mills. However, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case
the ICJ referred to the need for allegedly law-making instruments to have 
“a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as form-
ing the basis of a general rule of law.”27 It is far from evident that the pre-
cautionary approach as articulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration either
has or could have the necessary normative character to constitute a rule of law.
It is phrased in very general terms and says only that scientific uncertainty 
is not to be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures; it does
not say anything about what those measures should be. Of course, a pattern
of treaty provisions elaborating ‘precautionary measures’ might enable a new 
and more specific customary rule to emerge. A number of treaties dealing with
the marine environment do have such provisions, including the OSPAR
Convention28 and the POPS Convention,29 but in essence these agreements
simply strengthen the existing obligation to take preventive measures. Others,
including the London Dumping Convention,30 take a stronger approach by pro-
hibiting a potentially harmful activity unless the proponent State can show that
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31 See Freestone, ‘International Fisheries Law Since Rio: the Continued Rise of the
Precautionary Principle’, in Boyle and Freestone (n 23) ch. 7.
32 See A Nollkaemper, ‘What You Risk Reveals What You Value’, in Freestone and Hey (eds),
The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (The
Hague 1996) 80.
33 See Principle 15.
34 See ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 57th Session’
(2 May to 3 June and 11 July to 5 August 2005) UN Doc A/60/10 (2005) para. 477, and
ECHR, Golder v. UK (1975) 1 EHRR 524, paras. 10–36.
35 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford
2003) 276.
36 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 52nd Session’ (1 May
to 9 June and 10 July to 18 August 2000) UN Doc A/55/10 (2000) para. 716.
no harm is likely, but this reversal of the burden of proof is exceptional. It
was quite deliberately not adopted when a precautionary approach to fisheries
conservation was elaborated in some detail by Article 6 of the 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement.31 However, as Judge Treves observed in Southern Bluefin
Tuna, it was not necessary in that case to decide whether the precautionary
principle has customary law status or if so what it might then require.
If the precautionary principle is viewed not as a customary law rule but
simply as a general principle then its use by national and international courts
and by international organisations is easier to explain.32 General principles can
become especially influential when like the precautionary approach they are
adopted in a globally endorsed instrument such as the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development.33 General principles of this kind do not
have to create rules of customary law to have legal effect. Rather, their impor-
tance derives from the general influence they can exert on the interpretation,
application, and development of other rules of law. Decision-makers and
courts may rely on them when deciding cases and interpreting treaties, an
argument which appears to be supported by Article 31 (3) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties34 and by the Southern Bluefin Tuna provi-
sional measures decision discussed earlier. Moreover, the interpretation and
application of customary international law may also be affected. Thus, refer-
ring to the precautionary principle, Brownlie observes that “The point which
stands out is that some applications of the principle, which is based on the
concept of foreseeable risk to other States, are encompassed within existing
concepts of State responsibility”.35 The ILC Special Rappporteur on transboundary
harm has taken the same view, concluding that the precautionary principle is
already a component of customary rules on prevention of harm and environ-
mental impact assessment, ‘and could not be divorced therefrom’.36
From this perspective, the real importance of the precautionary principle is
that it redefines existing rules of international law on control of environmen-
tal risks and conservation of natural resources and brings them into play at an
earlier stage than before. No longer is it necessary to show that significant 
or irreversible harm is certain or likely before requiring that appropriate 
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37 See also the carefully balanced formulation reiterated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
and the ICJ’s references to the right of states to pursue sustainable development in Pulp
Mills (Provisional Measures) (n 1) para. 80.
38 Nuclear Tests Case [1995] ICJ Rep 288; Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros (n 10); MOX Plant
Arbitration (n 1); Land Reclamation (Provisional Measures) (n 1); Pulp Mills (Provisional
Measures) (n 1).
39 Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros (n 10) para. 140.
preventive measures be taken. Evidence that such harm is possible will be
enough to trigger an obligation to act. Like the UN Fish Stocks Agreement or
the POPS Convention, however, Southern Bluefin Tuna also shows that a pre-
cautionary approach does not reverse the burden of proof of harm in any of
these instances, even if the position with regard to dumping, whaling, or trade
in hazardous waste is to ban such activities unless they can be shown to pose
no risk of harm. Whatever the theoretical merits of a ‘no harm’ approach to
environmental protection may be, we should not forget that Article 193 of the
1982 LOSC carefully balances the sovereign right of States to exploit their
natural resources with their responsibility for protecting the marine environ-
ment. It does not give the latter priority over the former, and to that extent
does not prohibit all risk of harm.37
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Although at least five cases have involved alleged failures to undertake an
EIA,38 no court or tribunal has yet given a ruling which says anything very
useful about EIA in international law. In part this is because only the
Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros case reached the merits stage, and here it was mani-
festly too late to do an EIA after the event. More importantly, States gener-
ally have not contested the existence of a duty to undertake environmental
impact assessment. Typically, as in MOX Plant, Land Reclamation or Pulp
Mills, they argue about whether an appropriate EIA took place, not about
whether one is necessary at all. If any of these cases were ever to reach the
merits stage, the argument would thus focus on the adequacy of what was
done and the standard to be met. Even if the cases decide nothing about EIA,
they provide important evidence of State practice which points consistently in
the direction of recognising that where proposed activities are likely to harm
the environment, an EIA directed at transboundary impacts is a necessary pre-
liminary to consultation and co-operation with other potentially affected States.
In Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros the parties seem to have agreed on the necessity for
monitoring in accordance with international law and the court itself referred to
the need to ‘look afresh’ at the effects of activities begun in the past.39 In these
circumstances it should not be surprising that there has been no need to affirm
judicially what States say they already practice.
In principle an EIA of planned activities is required by Article 206 of the
1982 LOS Convention when States have ‘reasonable grounds for believing’
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40 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. This
Convention lists activities in respect of which an EIA is required if they are likely to have
a significant adverse transboundary impact. In disputed cases there is an inquiry procedure.
41 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Annex 1. This agreement
requires at least an initial examination of all activities covered by the Protocol.
that substantial pollution or significant harm to the marine environment may
result. This Article was pleaded in both MOX Plant and Land Reclamation.
Three significant questions remain unanswered: when does Article 206 apply,
how can potentially affected States ensure that an EIA takes place, and can a
court review the adequacy of an EIA? The evidential standard for showing the
‘reasonable grounds’ required for the application of Article 206 is unlikely to
be an onerous one—it would be self-defeating to demand proof of a risk of
harm as a pre-condition for doing an EIA, the purpose of which is to estab-
lish exactly that. The practice of the parties in MOX Plant and Pulp Mills sug-
gests that where large-scale industrial activities with a known risk of
potentially serious pollution are involved, the necessity of an EIA can be pre-
sumed, even if the likely risk is a small one. This would be consistent with
many national EIA laws and with more detailed regional EIA treaties such as
the ESPOO Convention40 and the Antarctic Environmental Protocol.41 Where
the nature of the risk is less certain than it was in MOX Plant or Pulp Mills,
interpretation in accordance with the precautionary principle would still sug-
gest a low evidential threshold for the application of Article 206. This con-
clusion is supported by the decision to order provisional measures in Southern
Bluefin Tuna and Land Reclamation—the measures amounting in effect to a
form of EIA insofar as expert studies were initiated into the risks involved.
The question whether an international court can review the adequacy of an
EIA is posed by the pleadings in MOX Plant and Pulp Mills. In both cases the
complainant State advanced arguments in favour of a prescriptive approach, 
drawing on detailed standards from national or regional law, and arguing that
the EIA in fact undertaken was inadequate. Both applicants seek to challenge
the conclusion that no significant harm is likely to affect other States or the
marine or riparian environment. Article 206 LOSC is silent on the question of
what is required in an EIA, and in contrast to Articles 207–211 it makes no
reference to internationally agreed rules and standards. In both MOX Plant and
Pulp Mills the respondent States argue that their EIA already meets the high-
est international standards and they rely on scientific evidence and the judg-
ment of independent bodies to justify the conclusion that the other State is not
at risk. Using litigation to challenge the standards and conclusions of an EIA
is not unknown in national law; there are American precedents, but it remains
to be seen how far an international court may be prepared to set aside an EIA
made in good faith on the basis of substantial scientific and technical evi-
dence. We will have to await a judgment on the merits to provide an answer
to any of these questions.
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42 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) (n 6) para. 79; Land Reclamation (Provisional
Measures) (n 1) para. 96.
43 Mox Plant case (Provisional Measures) (n 1) para. 82; Land Reclamation (Provisional Measures)
(n 1) para. 92.
44 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) (n 6) para. 78 and operative para. (e).
What we can observe from Southern Bluefin Tuna and Land Reclamation is
that provisional measures applications may afford a useful method for tackling
failure to do an EIA. In both cases the Tribunal found that the risk of harm
to the marine environment could not be excluded.42 In Land Reclamation it
expressly ordered the parties to assess the risks and effects of the works, while
in Southern Bluefin Tuna the effect of its order was that catch quotas could
only be increased by agreement after further studies of the state of the stock.
In Pulp Mills and MOX Plant, however, no such orders were made; not only
did the respondents’ EIAs show that there was no risk of significant or immi-
nent harm to the environment, but this was evidence which, crucially, the
applicants respectively failed to rebut or which they accepted in the oral hear-
ings. The contrasting outcomes in these four cases suggest that if an EIA has
not been undertaken and there is some evidence of a risk of serious harm to
the marine environment—even if the risk is uncertain and the potential harm
not necessarily irreparable—an order requiring the parties to co-operate in
prior assessment is likely to result even at the provisional measures stage. If
that is correct then a provisional measures application may be the best remedy
available to a potentially affected State seeking to enforce Article 206 LOSC.
Quite a lot remains to be decided about EIA in international law, and more
specifically about the scope and implications of Article 206 LOSC. So far, the
case law has barely scratched the surface.
Co-operation
In what may become the best-known passage from an ITLOS judgment, the
Tribunal has twice said that “the duty to co-operate is a fundamental princi-
ple in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII
of the Convention and general international law and that rights arise therefrom
which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to preserve under Article 290 of
the Convention”.43 In MOX Plant and Land Reclamation the parties were thus
ordered to improve their co-operation, and to consult, exchange information,
monitor or assess the risks and effects of their activities, and devise measures
to prevent pollution. Similarly, in Southern Bluefin Tuna the Tribunal empha-
sised the need for greater co-operation to ensure conservation and optimum
utilisation, and it ordered the parties to resume negotiations for that purpose
“without delay”.44 Moreover, in MOX Plant and Land Reclamation, as we
have seen, these co-operation orders were made notwithstanding findings that
the evidence did not show that irreparable harm was either imminent or likely.
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45 See n 1 above.
46 See Principles 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 27.
47 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101.
48 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay.
49 Nor does Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, which refers only to EIA “as a national instru-
ment . . .”
50 See, e.g., 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 24; UNGA
Resolutions 3129 XXVIII (1973) and 3281 XXIX (1974); UNEP, Principles of Conduct for
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (1978).
It is undoubtedly true that co-operation in the control of environmental risks
is one of the central elements of general international law on environmental
protection. The obligation of States to notify, consult and negotiate permeates
the ILC’s draft Articles on transboundary harm45 and the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development;46 it is also very clearly articulated in our
‘old friend’ the Lac Lanoux Arbitration,47 as well as in Gab ,cikovo-Nagymaros
and in various regional treaties, including the River Uruguay Treaty48 at issue
in the Pulp Mills Case. An obligation to co-operate is rather less clearly set
out in the 1982 LOSC. Article 123 somewhat weakly says that States border-
ing enclosed or semi-enclosed seas “should” co-operate with each other, while
Part XII requires States to co-operate but mainly in the task of adopting global
and regional rules and standards. Articles 204 and 206 on monitoring and
environmental impact assessment notably do not mention an obligation to co-
operate,49 although they require reports to be communicated to competent
international organisations. It may thus be significant that in its judgments the
Tribunal has referred to co-operation both under the LOSC and in general
international law, implying that in this respect the Convention has been given
a broader reading than its express terms by themselves would suggest. This is
an important conclusion, because it shows how the Convention can in appro-
priate cases be interpreted and applied taking general international law into
account. The idea that treaties can have a dynamic or living interpretation 
is an important contribution to the process of evolutionary change in inter-
national law. However, in this instance it is arguable that the Tribunal is
merely interpreting the Convention in accordance with general international
law as it already existed in 1982,50 rather than incorporating some wholly
novel developments.
The Land Reclamation case shows particularly clearly how obligations of
transboundary co-operation can be enforced using provisional measures. In
addition to ordering the parties to co-operate in establishing an independent
study, exchanging information and assessing the risks, the Tribunal also noted
that in the course of the hearing Singapore had given assurances that it would
notify, consult and negotiate with Malaysia before proceeding with further
works, while giving it the opportunity to comment and produce new evidence.
Without any decision on the merits, Malaysia thus secured commitments that
in substance addressed all of its rights to co-operation under the LOSC and
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general international law. This is perhaps not the Tribunal’s most exciting
judgment—but it is nevertheless a very remarkable outcome for a provisional
measures case—and one which effectively resolved the dispute without further
proceedings on the merits.
Some Conclusions on the Tribunal’s Jurisprudence
What conclusions can we draw from all this? First, the Tribunal’s provisional
measures cases have established the utility of the Article 290 procedure as a
means of protecting not only the rights of other States but also the marine
environment in general. Second, there is evidence in the case law of a desire
to settle disputes between the parties in a way that contributes to the develop-
ment of a consistent jurisprudence. Third, the Tribunal has demonstrated its
willingness to interpret and apply Part XII of the Convention consistently with
the contemporary state of international environmental law, while avoiding par-
ticularly radical outcomes. These are the conclusions we should expect to draw
from the jurisprudence of an international court, remembering that the princi-
pal purposes of the Convention’s provisions on dispute settlement are to pro-
vide authoritative mechanisms for determining questions relating to the
interpretation or application of the treaty, to guarantee the integrity of the text,
and to control its implementation and development by States parties. From this
point of view compulsory dispute settlement is designed to prevent fragmen-
tation of the conventional law of the sea, while at the same time allowing 
for its continued evolution in a coherent manner that reflects the consensus/
package deal character of the Convention. Nevertheless, Part XII is a product
of the early 1970s. The challenge facing any court which is called on to inter-
pret and apply it should not be underestimated, because in several important
respects the law has moved on, and will continue to do so. The Convention
was intended to have the flexibility to respond to change and within the above
limits the ITLOS has shown itself to be one of the mechanisms for enabling
it to do so.
The Tribunal’s record on marine environmental disputes is thus a positive
one, despite the absence of any opportunity to decide such a case on its mer-
its. However, it is clear that two problems of larger significance remain. First,
given that Annex VII arbitration has emerged as the principal forum for hear-
ing the merits of LOSC disputes, the task of ensuring consistent and coherent
interpretation and application of Part XII is made harder than it would be if
ITLOS were the default forum—unless of course Annex VII arbitrators con-
tinue to refuse jurisdiction in environmental cases. That is the second problem.
What might have seemed a relatively comprehensive system of compulsory
settlement of disputes concerning the marine environment has become a
minefield of jurisdictional complexity, revealed most plainly in MOX Plant
and Southern Bluefin Tuna. The most difficult aspect of this problem concerns
the relationship between the LOSC and regional treaties. Regional environ-
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mental and fisheries treaties often amplify the framework provisions of the
LOSC; only rarely do they mirror its dispute settlement provisions. How
should a LOSC tribunal respond to a dispute which straddles both the LOSC
and a regional implementation treaty? The answers are confused. In Southern
Bluefin Tuna the arbitrators chose to integrate the application of the LOSC and
the 1993 Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, but in
doing so they concluded that the latter treaty had deprived them of jurisdic-
tion to decide the dispute under the former. Logically, on this basis ITLOS no
longer has prima facie jurisdiction even for provisional measures in such
cases. In MOX Plant, neither the ITLOS nor the arbitrators took an integrated
view of the LOSC and the 1992 OSPAR Convention, preferring to see them
as parallel but separate regimes. However, by keeping the treaties separate
they deprived themselves of jurisdiction to apply OSPAR in an LOSC dispute.
On this approach both ITLOS and the Annex VII tribunal retain prima facie
LOSC jurisdiction for the purpose of granting provisional measures in such
disputes.
It is not possible for both of these cases to be correct on this issue; the
choice between them is essentially one of policy, but at some point a choice
will have to be made. When we come to problems of this kind the drawbacks
of relying on ad hoc arbitration as the main forum for LOSC dispute settle-
ment stand out rather too starkly. Contrasting the record of ITLOS with that
of Annex VII arbitrations on protection of the marine environment leaves this
commentator in no doubt that the ITLOS has taken a more considered and
consistent view of the Convention and the settlement of disputes. If there is
one urgent need for amendment of the LOSC it would be to substitute an ad
hoc chamber of the ITLOS as a default forum for Part XV jurisdiction in place
of Annex VII arbitration. As things stand, there is a real risk that the present
system will neither settle disputes nor develop the law in a coherent way—but
that will be no fault of the Tribunal’s.
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